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BLOTTER

[L. A. No. 23084.

v.

FARRELL

In Bank.

[42 C.2d

May 18, 1954.]

FRANCIS C. BLOTTER et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES
D. FARRELL, as Mayor, etc., et al., Respondents.
[1] Municipal Corporations- Initiative and Referendum- Com-

pelling Election.-Petition for writ of mandate to compel city
council to submit to electorate proposed redistricting ordinance does not refer merely to original initiative petition
signed by 11 per cent of voters calling for such election so as
to come within Elec. Code, § 1712, relating to petitions signed
by not less than 10 per cent of voters, rather than § 1711,
relating to petitions signed by not less than 15 per cent of
voters, but refers also to a supplemental initiative petition
signed by more than 16 per cent of registered voters, where
petition for writ of mandate complains both of inaction of
council at meeting at which original initiative petition was
presented and of inaction of council after a formal demand
was made, on date following certification of supplemental petition, that mayor and council consider proposed ordinance and
petition.
[2] !d.-Initiative and Referendum-Petition-Supplemental Petition.-Elec. Code, § 1709, permitting a supplemental initiative
petitioi1 when original one is insufficient, does not prohibit
supplemental initiative petitions in other cases.
[3] Statutes-Construction-Initiative and Referendum Statutes.
-Power of initiative and referendum is exercise by people
of power reserved to them and not exercise of a right granted
to them, and hence statutory provisions dealing with referendum should be afforded same liberal construction afforded
election statutes generally.
[ 4a, 4b] Municipal Corporations- Miscellaneous Powers- Power
to Redistrict.-Gov. Code, §§ 34871, 34876, 35322, 35323, setting
forth authority whereby a city of sixth class may be divided
into councilmanic districts and whereby districts may be
altered or new districts added when new territory is annexed
to such city, containing no provision prohibiting redistricting,
include, by necessary implication, the power to redistrict,
periodical changes in such districts being essential to prevent
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Municipal Corporations, § 256;
[2] Municipal Corporations,§ 254; [3] Statutes,§ 20.5; [4] Municipal Corporations, § 111; [5, 7] Municipal Corporations, § 253;
[6] Municipal Corporations, §§ 227, 228.
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[5]

[ 6]

[7]

[8]

drastic population differences from destroying representative
system of government.
!d.-Initiative and Referendum-Scope of Power.-An ordinance proposed by electors of a city under the initiative law
must constitute such legislation as legislative body of city
has power to enact under the law granting, defining and limiting powers of such body.
!d.-Ordinances-Amendment: Repeal.-The power to enact
ordinances generally includes, by necessary implication, the
power to amend or repeal them.
!d.-Initiative and Referendum-Scope of Power.-In view
of fact that it is generally accepted that most forms of legislation may be proposed, repealed or amended by proper exercise
of the initiative and that under Elec. Code, § 1701,· any proposed ordinance may be submitted to city council by petition
filed with clerk of council after being signed by requisite
number of voters, the proposed redistricting of councilmanic
districts within a city of sixth class is available by way of
initiative petition.
!d.-Initiative and Referendum-Compelling Election.-Where
original and supplemental initiative petitions calling for special
election for purpose of adopting proposed ordinance changing
boundary lines of councilmanic districts of sixth class city
were signed by more than 16 per cent of registered voters, a
request was made that ordinance be submitted to immediate
vote of people, and published notice of intention to circulate
initiative petition provided that purpose of such circulation
was to have placed on ballot a law providing for redistricting,
city council was under a duty either to pass proposed ordinance immediately or to call a special election for that purpose
(see Elec. Code,§ 1711), and having refused to discharge that
duty and to fix a proper time for election the council may be
compelled to do so by mandamus.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County. Thomas P. 0 'Donnell, Judge.* Reversed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel submission of an ordinance to vote of city electors. Judgment dismissing petition
and judgment on the pleadings for defendants, reversed.
[5] Character or subject matter of ordinance within operation
of initiative or referendum, note, 122 A.L.R. 769. See, also, Cal.
Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 229; Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 208 et seq.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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IJeOIHJ.rd A Boek for AppcllantR.
W. Uolegate, City Attorney
, and ,Jerome ,J. Bunker, Assistant City Attorney, for Respondents.
CARTER, J.---Plaintiffs, who are citizens of the city of
Palm Springs, appeal from a dismissal of their petition for
\Hit of mandate and a judgment on the pleadings in favor
of the defendants, Mayor Charles D. Farrell, the city council
of the city of Palm Springs et al.
During Pebruary and March of 1952, plaintiffs as citizens
of the city of Palm Springs, circulated two initiative petitions
in said city. These petitions, which called for a special election
for the purpose of adopting a proposed ordinance changing
the boundary lines of the councilmanic districts, were presented to the city council on or about March 26, 1952, and
by it referred to a committee for study and recommendation.
The council failed to act on the petitions, and on or about
April 15, 1952, refused to snbmit the proposed ordinance
to a vote of the electors or call an election for that purpose.
Thereafter the plaintiffs commenced this proceeding to obtain
a writ of mandate compelling the mayor and city council of
the city of Palm Springs (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) to submit the proposed ordinance to the vote of the
city electors.
'l'he record indicates that the city of Palm Springs, a city
of the sixth class, was incorporated in April, 1938. That
as a part of the petition for incorporation, and pursuant to
section 852d of the Municipal Corporations Act (now covered
by Gov. Code, § 34870 et seq.), the city was laid out in
seyen councilmanic districts numbered one through seven. In
their inception, these original districts each contained as nearly
as possible the same voting strength.
During the years following the city's incorporation, some
of the councilmanic districts exprrienced a large increase in
population ·while the population of other districts increased
very little. As a result of these population chang·es, the voting
strength of the various councilmanic districts became seriously
disproportionate. The extent of this inequality may be illustrated by the fact that in 1951 over 5,000 of the city's inhabitants resided in the first and second districts while the
combined population of the fourth and seventh districts
totaled less than 600 persons. This unequal distribution of
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population and voting strength among the various councilmanic districts (as of October, 1951) gave the 1,046 registered ·
voters of the five smallest districts the power to elect five
councilmen while the 1,978 registered voters of the two largest districts could only elect two councilmen.
In an effort to bring about a redistricting and to equalize
the population of the various eouncilmanic districts, plaintiffs
circulated the aforementioned initiative petitions, which were
eventually signed by more than 16 per cent of the city's
registered voters. The defendants refused to act on the petitions and took the position that the city council was without
authority to adopt an initiative ordinance for redistricting.
Following this refusal_ to submit the proposed ordinance to
a vote of the electors or to call an election for that purpose,
plaintiffs commenced this proceeding to compel the defendants
to act. Both plaintiffs and defendants moved for a judgment
on the pleadings and after the oral arguments on said motions
the trial court determined that the petition for writ of mandate
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
'l'he petition was dismissed and a judgment on the pleadings
rendered in favor of the defendants.
Defendants' argument that the initiative petition can only
be considered as one containing the signatures of not less than
10 per cent of the voters so as to come within section 1712 1 of
the Elections Code rather than section 1711, 2 is without merit.
The argument of the defendants is based upon two separate
grounds : First that the petition for writ of mandate only
covered the original initiative petition and secondly that
plaintiffs had no authority to file a suppemental initiative
petition.
[1] In support of their argument that the petition for
writ of mandate only covered the original initiative petition,

wu the initiative petition is signed by not less than ten per eent of
the voters of the city, and the ordinance petitioned for is not required
to be, or for any reason is not, ~uiHnittPd to the voters at a special
eler.tion, and is not passed without dmnge by thr
body,
then the ordinnnee without alteration. shall he
lJy the
legislative body to the voters at the next regular municipal election."
""If the initiative petition is signed by not less than fifteen per cent
of the voters of the city aud eontains a request that the onlinance be
snl>mitte<l immediately to a vo1<· of 0"• rwopJ,· ;11 :1 sp<·ei;d e];"ction. thPH
the legislative body shall either:
"(a) Pass the onlinanee withont aHeration at the reg·ubr meeting
nt whieh it is presented and within teu days nfter it is prese11tcd.
"(b) Immediately call a special election at which the ordinance,
without alteration, shall be submitted to a vote of the voters of the
city."
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defendants pointed out that plaintiffs' original initiative
petition was certified by the clerk on March
1952, to contain the signatures of 11 per cent of the voters; that the
supplemental initiative petition, bringing the number of
sig·ners up to more than 16 per cent of the registered voters
was not certified until March
1952; and that since Paragraph XV of the petition for vvrit of mandate stated that
the initiative petitions were submitted by the clerk to the
council "on or about March 26, 1952" it conld only refer to
the original initiative petition. It is thus argued that since
the action of the city council complained of was the action
taken on the 26th of March, only the original initiative petition was at issue and therefore section 1712 of the Elections
Code rathe1· than section 1711 should be applicable.
Defendants' reasoning fails to take into consideration
Paragraph XVI of the petition for writ of mandate which
provided in part that ''although formal demand was, on the
15th day of April 1952 made on said Mayor and Council,
the said Mayor and Council did fail, neglect and refuse to
consider said proposed ordinance and petition and have refused to submit the same to the vote of the electors. . . . ''
Thus it appears that the petition for writ of mandate complained not only of the inaction at the council meeting of
March 26 but also of the inaction after the demand of April15,
1952, and therefore the demand involved both the original
and the supplemental initiative petitions.
Defendants also argue that the Sllpplemental initiative petition was unauthorized by the Elections Code and therefore
section 1711 of the Elections Code (regarding initiative petitions which are signed by 15 per cent or more of the registered
voters) is not applicable. This argument is based upon the
fact that the original initiative petition containing the signature of 11 per cent of the voters was sufficient for the
application of section 1712 and that therefore under section
1709 of the Elections Code a supplemental petition was not
authorized. Defendants cite no authority upon which to base
such a contention but merely refer us to the code sPction.
[2] Section 1709 provides that "If the clerk's certificate
shows the petition to be insufficient, a supplemental petition,
in form a duplicate of the original petition, bearing additional
signatures. may be filed within ten days of the date of the
certificate of insufficiency.'' This Rection permits a supplemental initiative petition when the original one is insufficient.
'fhe wording is permissive and does not appear to prohibit
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:Oomi~guez,

raJ ~s stated

212 .Cal. .587,, · 593 [29f:)

that .the. power o:f initiative and
as eJ>:ercised in this stat~, is the e~e'.t'<iise by the
rfoSfYrved to them, al1d n\')t the. exercis~ 9f. a
· . . . [Citat~on~:l For that te~son, and,
nr<)te!~t
people of this state in< the exere~~~ ,of
.,."'<'"'.,.'"an
statutory or chart<Jr ptovis,o:n
be 8/fordeq the saDfe Iibetal
c03J$t.rn<llac•n a:ttmw.erfl '"''"'"~""'' stat:pt•es generally." (S(le A!so
[153 P. 985J.)
Ih view
the
wording of section 1709jnd
the ;rule oflibei'al constr;uction,, which . aJ:lplicable to :Statutes
dealh!g with the initiative power, it w()uld appear Jliat plain,..,.
tiliJ:rwere not prohibited from :filing·a. s.v.P~lementll!-1. initiatiV(l
petition in the iustantcase, '.['he. net. result was. a :legaU;y
sufii~ie;n:t init~ative petitioA conta,ining the signatures ~f.lJl()re
tha:n 16 per cent of. the registered vt>ters of the Qity <>f P~tlm
S)jl'ing~.. ..
.·
•O;n appeal pla,i11titrs contend that ilie. po~er pf the ele~torlil
o(the city to district ineiu.aes, by ilnplication, . . pow-er to
a:Qltind.or cJli:l,n,ge those districts; that.an ordinance p;rovid'
for .a redistricting is a~ailable .by way .of initiativ-e; a!lil.
the cf,t.r COU.4eil was under duty.to.. e~the! .Pa~s the: P~!!PO~~d
ordina;nee. ()r submit ~t to. .· Y{)ter-s at. a. speciaJ electio;n,
.J:n regard to the power to r~district, pl~i;ntiffs alleg~ .that
it based upon, sectil)ns 34871,. 34876,. 31)32~,
. 36323 ~
Government Code~ .. SectioJ134871 f,)fthe.Goverument Q~e
pro~i<les th~t .. . anrlJl:U:Uicipal ele;t;tion, or special ele.~tio~
ll~ld ~ol'. i;ha,t ];>11J;pose;. the Jegisiath;e boqy may suh.mit ·to
tl:+e,el~ctors ..a.n otdinance prov-iding .for. the· (l'tection of D:l~fr\;
. b~~s of th.e1el3'islative hod;t by districts,'' .IJudet the provi~ip'n,s
Q;~.lb.i~st?ctif.!n.a.eity.qfthe.sixili class ivb.ich h~s hee;neJM~~g~
the nie:rnbers o;! its legislative b9dy :f;r'om the (lity at I;ar~ is
aut~o,tized to: submit to. t])e el~cto;rs a11 ordmaMe Tfnder wlljt~h
sl;tc}i D:letlJ.hers woulq be elected by distrtets; .Seetion34B'l;t3is
prov-ides that w.here a city of the sixth class incorP()rl!ttes, tlfe.
petitio;n for. il:l;coi"poration ma,y.. provide. for tP:e ¢I.e~~on ·tl:f
mewbers of the legislative body by districts. By the ena:etmetit
rej~er,en<tUln,

is

~('Inelusi~n ~f

f;neoFPtmtiio~ .·I£. th~.l)(lti~

.
prnvisinhs in .petition. for
tipn. fu.r ln.eQ')tpoFat:ion llf ..a sixth .class city J?l'<lvides fQt ~h~ e:leetio:l;l
of memtters of zthe. legisltttive body by distri~ts .·and. includes substantialJ.y the pl'!JVfliipns required to be melttlle.d i'li au Ol'din!>UCe J)l'QV:iding
fnr sn(lfi. eleet~o;n, th.e membets shall be elect~ purl!ttant to thls tJ;itie16}1
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of section 35322~ the I.Jegislature gave to cities of the sixth
class authority to alter
ordinance the boundaries of wards
or to create additional wards ·where new territory is annexed
to said city. ']'his is Eolloweu by seetion 3532~3 which provides
that ''In altering the boundaries of wards, or creating new
wards, eaeh ward shall contain, as nearly as possible, an equal
number of inhabitants eligible to citizenship.''
[ 4a] In substance the foregoing sections set forth the
authority whereby a city of the sixth class may be divided
into councilmanic districts and whereby the districts may be
altered or new districts added when new territory is annexed
to such city. No other specific reference to redistricting is
made.
[5] It is well recognized that "an ordinance proposed by
the electors of a county or city of this state, under the Initiative Law must constitute such legislation as the legislative
body of such county or city has the power to enact under the
law granting, defining and limiting the powers of such body"
(Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 140 [277 P. 308]),
and therefore it must be determined whether any power or
authority to redistrict existed. Granting that the power to
divide a city into councilmanic districts is amply provided
for under the foregoing sections, we are confronted with
the problem of whether the power to district gives, by necessary implication, the power to redistrict. To put it another
way, does the power to legislate on a particular subject include
the power to repeal or amend such legislation or must such
power be specifically spelled out in each instance?
In Foster v. Police Comrs., 102 Cal. 483, 489 [37 P. 763,
41 Am.St.Rep. 194], this court stated that the power to
legislate on a particular subject "necessarily includes the
power to amend an existing regulation upon the same subject; . . . '' In discussing the repeal of municipal legislation
it has been stated that ''It will be presumed that an ordinance
duly passed continues to exist, and the burden is upon one
claiming a repeal to show it. However, it is clearly within
the power of the council of a city to repeal any ordinance
"'Territory annexed to city divided into wards: Alteration or addition of wards. Where territory is annexed to a city divided into wards,
or to a city which later divides itself into wards, the legislative body,
by ordinance, shall alter the boundaries of the city w:uds to il\clude
the annexed territory in one or more wards adjoining the territory,
or make one Ol" more arlclitional wards out of the annexed territory.
The numher of wards shall not be iue\'eascd to exceed the number
which the city i~ allowed by law."
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passed by it which does not affect the contractual relation
of the city." (18 Cal.Jur. 215.)
[6] Frequently a municipal corporation is given the express power by charter or statute to make, repeal or amend
ordinances; however, such is not necessary since ''it is the
general rule that power to enact ordinances implies power,
unless otherwise provided in the grant, to repeal them. It is
patently obvious that the effectiveness of any legislative body
would be entirely destroyed if the power to amend or repeal
its legislative acts were taken away from it. . . . The power
of repeal extends, generally speaking, to all ordimmees. Indeed, a munieipal corporation cannot abridge its own legislative powers by the passage of irrevoeable ordinances . . . .
Aecordingly, in the absence of a valid provision to the contrary, a munieipal council or assembly, having the power to
legislate on, or exercise diseretionary or regulatory authority
over, any given subject may exercise that power at will by
enacting or repealing an ordinance in relation to the subject.''
(McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., vol. 6, § 21.10.)
Thus it would appear that the power to legislate generally
indudes, by neeessary implication, the power to amend or
repeal existing legislation. This implied power to amend and
repeal is espeeially necessary in regard to establishment of
councilmanic boundaries sinee our democratic system of government requires, whenever possible, elpmlity of representation.
The problem of population equality among roleetion areas
is not eonfined to state or national lewls, it exists whenever
divisions of territory and population are made for the purpose
of electing popular representatives. [4b] Thus as a neeessary
consequenee of our democratic system of government, the
councilmanie distriets must be changed periodically to prevent drastic population differences from destroying the representative system of government. In the instant case the
Government Code contains no provision prohibiting redistricting, and, therefore, the specific power to district should, by
necessary implication, include the power to redistrict.
Granting that the power to redistrict does exist, it must
be determined whether or not such proposed redistrieting
legislation is available by way of initiative prtition. In thiR
respect it should be noted that the power to t1istrict nnder
sections 34871 and 34876 of the Government Code is given
exclusively to the electors, while the power to distriet or
redistrict nuder sections 35322 and 35323 (when new territory is annexed) is given clireetly to the city council and
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indirectly to the electors under their initiative powers granted
by the Constitution of California. It is therein provided
that ''The initiative and referendum powers of the people
are hereby further reserved to the electors of each county,
city and county, city and town of the State to be exercised
under such procedure as may be provided by law.'' (Cal.
Const., art. IV, § 1.)
It is generally accepted that most forms of legislation
may be proposed, repealed or amended by the proper exercise
of the initiative (see McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3c1
ed., supm, vol. G, § 21.11) and under the provisions of section
1701 of the Elections Code ''Any proposed ordinance may
be submitted to the legislative body of the city by a petition
filed with the clerk of the legislative body after being signed
by not less than the number of voters specified in this chapter. . . . "
[7] In view of the foregoing authorities it appears that
the power to redistrict did exist and that such legislation
could be proposed by initiative petition. [8] The only remaining question is whether or not the city council was
under any duty to call a special election, when requested to
do so, for the purpose of submitting the proposed ordinance
to the electors. Section 1711 of the Elections Code provides
that ''If the initiative petition is signed by not less than
fifteen per cent of the voters of the city and contains a request
that the ordinance be submitted immediately to a vote of the
people at a special election, then the legislative body shall
either: (a) Pass the ordinance without alteration at the regular meeting at which it is presented and within ten days
after it is presented. (b) Immediately call a special election
at which the ordinance without alteration, shall be submitted
to a vote of the voters of the city." In the case at bar, the
original and supplemental initiative petitions were signed
by more than 16 per cent of the registered voters; the request
was made that the ordinance be submitted to an immediate
vote of the people; and the published notice of intention to
circulate the initiative petition provided that "the purpose
of circulating this petition is to have placed upon a ballot
at a special election to be held in this city, a law providing
for redistricting. . . . " It would thus appear that the city
council was under a duty to either pass the proposed ordinance
immediately or to call a special election for that purpose.
Where a city council refuses to discharge its duty and fix a
proper time for the election, it may be compelled to do so by
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mandamus. (See Locher v. Walsh, 17 Cal.A.pp. 727 [121
P. 712] .)
We conclude, therefore, that the power to redistrict did
exist by necessary implication; that an initiative petition was
a proper method of proposing such legislation; that the petition here involved was sufficient for that purpose ; and that
when properly submitted the city council was under a duty
to take immediate action.
The judgment is therefore reversed.
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tem.,*1
concurred.
SHENK, J.-I dissent.
It is of course conceded, as a general proposition, that an
ordinance proposed by the electors of a city under the initiative law mnst constitute such legislation as the legislative
body has the power to enact. Conversely it is true that if
the city council was without power to adopt the redistricting
ordinance here involved it could not be compelled to do so
through the medium of an initiative petition, and likewise
would not be authorized to submit it to the electorate of the
city for adoption. (Hurst v. City_of Burl·ingarne, 207 Cal. 134,
140-141 [277 P. 308) .)
In the present case the majority discover an irnplication
in the provisions of the Government Code relating to the
districting of cities to the effect that such cities also have
the power to redistrict their territory. (Gov. Code, §§ 34871
and 34876.) Those sections are contained in that part of the
Government Code setting out the procedures and conditions
under which a city of the sixth class may provide for the
election of its legislative body by districts, either at the time
of its incorporation or at a time after the city has functioned
with a legislative body chosen at large. If it be true that
those and other sections imply a power to redistrict, as held
by the majority, then the mode and method prescribed by
the Legislature for districting a city should be followed when
redistricting is sought to be brought about. Such special
procedures are in substance set forth in Government Code,
section 3487 4, as follows: ''If three-fourths of the qualified
electors of the City vote in favor of the ordinance [to district
a city then functioning with a legislative body chosen at
large], at the expiration of the terms of office of the members
*Assigned by Chairman o:f Judicial Council.
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of the legislativr: body or when a vacancy occurs, members
of the legislative
:shall be elected by districts." However,
redistricting the
as proposed by the ordinance in the
present case vvould become valid and binding, if enacted
nnder the initiative law, if "a majority of the voters . . . vote
in its favor," and it would "be considered as adopted upon
the date that the vote is declared by the canvassing board,
and shall go into effect ten days thereafter.'' (Elec. Code,
§ 1715.) 'l1 he discrepancies in procedure between the proposed method of redistricting and the one provided for
in the Government Code are obvious and substantial. The
initiative process does not accord applicable procedural safeguards afforded by the special legislation on the particular
subject.
In Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, 207 Cal. 134, this
court held invalid a zoning ordinance of the city of Burlingame enacted by initiative. Procedural provisions of the
Zoning Act of 1917 (Stats. 1917, p. 1419) had not been complied with. The court stated at pages 140 and 141: "It is too
clear for controversy that if the Board of Trustees of the
City of Burlingame had adopted the ordinance in question
without compliance with the requirements of the Zoning Act
above outlined said ordinance would have been inoperative
and void. It is equally clear that the infirmity would not be
cured by the purported adoption of the ordinance by the
electors of the City under the initiative law . . . . The Zoning
Act is a special statute dealing with a particular subject
and must be deemed to be controlling over the initiative,
which is general in its scope.'' The failure to comply with
the districting provisions of the Government Code by the
method through vvhieh the defendant city is sought to be
redistricted in the present case creates a situation which cannot
be materially distinguished from that in the Hurst case, and
there is no reason why the same principles of law should
not apply.
There is another good reason why the city council was
not required to submit the proposed ordinance to the electorate.
The effect of the ordinance, if enacted either by the council
or under the initiative process, would be to oust the incumbents from a portion of the districts they now represent,
leave some areas with two councilmen and others with none,
create confusion within the newly created districts as to the
right of recall by electors therein, and reduce to an absurdity
the residential requirements of both councilmen and electors.
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This would east in doubt the validity of the status of the
membership of the city council and any legislation or other
official action of that body. It was never intended that an
ordinance with the foregoing consequences could be passed
by the council or be subject to the initiative process. In
commenting· on the scope of the reservation to the people of
the power to enact legislation by initiative, it has been correctly stated that consideration must be given to the consequences of applying it to a particular act of legislation. Thus
if it be found that the inevitable effect of direct legislation
would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of
some essential or indispensable governmental power, then in
such case it is said that the courts may and should assume
that the people intended no such result to flow from the
application of those powers and that they do not so apply.
(Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal.App. 561, 569-570 [153 P. 397] ;
18 CaLJ ur. 946-947; see also Starbuck v. City of Fullerton,
34 Cal.App. 683 [186 P. 583] .)
The city council properly refused to pass or to submit to
the electorate a provision which, if enacted, would not constitute proper legislation (Hyde v. Wilde, 51 CaLApp. 82, 84
[196 P. 118] ), and mandamus should not be invoked to
compel the performance of an act when, as here, there is no
duty to perform it. I would affirm the judgment.
EDMONDS, J.-Admittedly, the Legislature has made no
express provision for redistricting cities of the sixth class by
an initiative measure, and to imply such a procedure, in my
opinion, requires the court to reason from analogies which
do not fit.
The conclusion that such a procedure is a proper one
appears to be based upon this reasoning: (1) certain.,provisions of the Government Code permit the legislative body
of the city to enact or submit to the voters measures relating
to councilmanic districting; (2) as a general rule, the power
to enact includes the power to amend or rep~al legislation;
( 3) the initiative process includes those measures which the
legislative body may enact.
I do uot believe that a geueral power of redistricting
properly may be impli(~d from the limited situations provided
for disi.riei ing Lbe eity in the first instance. The situationl'l
relied upon aR permitting districting are limited in number,
and in each instance, a procedure is required which differs
from that of the others. But in each case, the result is the
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same-the city is divided into councilmanic districts. Accordingly, it is impossible to state, and the majority do not
attempt to delineate, the exact basis and the proper procedure
for implying a power to redistrict.
It seems clear that the fault lies not in the failure of the
Legislature to indicate clearly a method of redistricting,
but in its failure to provide for such a procedure at all.
Rather than to attempt to create such a procedure by judicial
legislation, it would be preferable for the eourt to await the
aetion of the Legislature to enact a measure for redistricting
with the procedural safeguards it may deem appropriate.
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 16,
1954. Shenk, Acting C. ,J., and Edmonds, .T., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 23046.

In Bank.

May 25, 1954.]

WALTER FRANKLYN GROSS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-Inasmuch as
W elf. & Inst. Code, § 5519, authorizes a person who has been
committed as a sexual psychopath to have his condition reascertained at intervals of not less than six months, such redetermination would be a proceeding after original commitment substantially affecting rights of the paTty and original
order of commitment, and on that basis an ordeT of court
,.finding defendant to be still a sexual psychopath and ordering
him committed to Department of Mental Hygiene for placement at designated island could be appealable under Code Civ.
PToc., § 963, which provides that an appeal may be taken from
a superiOT couTt "judgment" enteTed in a "special proceeding"
and "any special order made after final judgment."
[2] !d.-Proceeding on Issue of Sex Psychopathy-Nature of Proceeding.-Sexual psychopathy proceedings are special proceedings of a civil natUTe which are collateral to criminal case.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, ~ 1053; [2] Criminal
Law, § 236.1; [3] Criminal Law, § 1049; [ 4] CTiminal Law, §§ 1049,
1053; [ 5] Courts, § 121; [ 6] Bail, § 1.

